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The Supreme Court’s Municipal Bond Decision
and the Market-Participant Exception to the
Dormant Commerce Clause
DAN T. COENEN ∗
Does it violate the dormant Commerce Clause for a state to exempt interest
earned on its own bonds, but no others, from income taxation? In a recent
decision, the Supreme Court answered this question in the negative. Six
members of the Court found the case controlled by the state-self-promotion
exception to the dormancy doctrine's antidiscrimination rule. Three of those
Justices, however, went further by also invoking the longstanding marketparticipant exception to sustain the discriminatory state tax break. This
Essay challenges that alternative line of analysis. According to the author,
the plurality's effort to apply the market-participant principle: (1) invites a
problematic reframing of basic market-participant rhetoric, (2) threatens
ill-advised changes in longstanding Commerce Clause doctrine, and (3)
injects far-reaching uncertainty into an already complex field of
constitutional law. For all these reasons, a majority of the Court should
reject the plurality's approach, and lower courts should refuse to follow it
in the meantime.
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INTRODUCTION
A major case of the Supreme Court’s most recent term presented a
vexing constitutional question: Can a state provide an income tax exemption
for interest paid on bonds issued by it, but not for interest paid on other
bonds, including bonds issued by sister states? 1 In Department of Revenue v.
Davis, the Court ruled that this form of state tax relief—despite its obvious
favoritism of intrastate transactions—did not offend the ban on
discrimination against interstate commerce embedded in the so-called
“dormant Commerce Clause.” 2
Justice Souter wrote the Court’s controlling opinion. That opinion was
controlling only in part, however, because one of the two rationales he
offered did not command a majority vote. 3 The dispositive analysis was set
forth in Part III-A, which was joined in full by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Stevens, Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 4 There, Justice Souter
reasoned that the constitutionality of Kentucky’s exemption for in-state
public bond interest followed easily from the Court’s recent decision in
United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management
Authority. 5 In Part III-B of his opinion, Justice Souter advanced the
alternative rationale that the Kentucky program was sustainable in any event
under the longstanding “market participant doctrine” to the dormant
Commerce Clause. 6 This portion of the opinion was joined only by Justices
1 Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
2 Id. at 1802. For general treatments of the dormant Commerce Clause, see BORIS I.

BITTKER, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE
§§ 6.01, at 6-1 to 10.02, at 10-4 (1999); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 401–34 (2d ed. 2002); DAN T. COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 209–342 (2004) [hereinafter COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW];
LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1021–1102 (3d ed. 2000).
3 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811–14.
4 Id. at 1810–11.
5 Id. at 1810 (citing United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007)).
6 Id. at 1811–14. For some of the many discussions of the market-participant
exception in the legal literature, see generally Thomas K. Anson & P.M. Schenkkan,
Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEX. L.
REV. 71 (1980); Theodore Y. Blumoff, The State Proprietary Exception to the Dormant
Commerce Clause: A Persistent Nineteenth Century Anomaly, 1984 S. ILL. U. L.J. 73;
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Stevens and Breyer. The other three Justices who had joined Part III-A saw
no need to go beyond reliance on United Haulers, accordingly declined to
sign onto Part III-B, and thereby deprived that portion of the opinion of
binding precedential force. 7 As a result, the impact of Justice Souter’s
market-participant analysis in Davis, for now, remains undetermined.
This Essay advances the argument that the three Justices who came
together in Part III-B of the Davis opinion took a series of wrong turns. The
argument proceeds in three steps. Part I of this Essay frames the discussion
by identifying just what the Court held, and did not hold, when it embraced a
new state-self-promotion exception to the dormant Commerce Clause
antidiscrimination rule in United Haulers and Part III-A of Davis. 8 Part II
turns to the market-participant doctrine and undertakes a wide-ranging
critique of the portion of Justice Souter’s opinion in which he and his two
colleagues applied that doctrine to Kentucky’s taxing scheme. Part III builds
on Part II by demonstrating why an embrace of Justice Souter’s marketparticipation analysis would, at the very least, have the harmful effect of
injecting needless new uncertainties into an already complex field of law.

Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395 (1989) [hereinafter Coenen, Untangling the
Market-Participant Exemption]; Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66
TEX. L. REV. 1097 (1988); Treg A. Julander, State Resident Preference Statutes and the
Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 24 WHITTIER L. REV.
541 (2002); A. Dan Tarlock, National Power, State Resource Sovereignty and
Federalism in the 1980’s: Scaling America’s Magic Mountain, 32 U. KAN. L. REV. 111
(1983); Michael Wells & Walter Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction
in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073 (1980); Norman R. Williams, Taking Care of
Ourselves: State Citizenship, the Market, and the State, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 469 (2008).
7 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1821–22. Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia were
explicit on this point. In a short separate opinion, the Chief Justice observed that “the
case is readily resolved by last Term’s decision in United Haulers”; “[a] majority of the
Court shares this view”; and “[t]hat being the case, I see no need to proceed to the
alternative analysis in Part III-B.” Id. at 1821. In similar fashion, Justice Scalia wrote: “I
do not join Part III-B of the opinion of the Court because I think Part III-A adequately
resolves the issue.” Id. In yet another separate opinion, Justice Thomas voted with the
majority to uphold the tax exemption (while not joining its opinion) based on the theory
that the dormant Commerce Clause principle is illegitimate and should never be applied.
Id. at 1821–22. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito, filed a dissenting opinion, id. at
1822–30, which critiqued (among other things) Justice Souter’s market-participant
analysis.
8 For a comprehensive discussion of the newly-minted state-self-promotion rule, see
Dan T. Coenen, Where United Haulers Might Take Us: The Future of the State-SelfPromotion Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause Rule, 95 IOWA L. REV.
(forthcoming Feb. 2010) (manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Coenen, Where
United Haulers Might Take Us].
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As this review demonstrates, adoption of the market-participant analysis
advanced by Justice Souter would bring much mischief to future judicial
decision-making. Indeed, endorsement of that analysis could dramatically
narrow existing safeguards of our economic union, including spurring on
abandonment of central and salutary features of current dormant Commerce
Clause case law. 9 Faced with these risks, the Court should repudiate Part IIIB of Justice Souter’s opinion at its first opportunity. In the meantime, lower
courts should pay no heed to the plurality’s novel—and dangerous—marketparticipant analysis.

I. DAVIS AND UNITED HAULERS
At the heart of the Court’s treatment of the 2008 Davis case lay its 2007
decision in United Haulers. There, the Court upheld municipal ordinances
that required the delivery of all locally generated solid waste to a
government-run waste transfer station, thus excluding private firms that
operated in neighboring states from competing in that segment of the local
waste market. 10 Distinguishing its earlier decision in C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkstown, 11 the Court in United Haulers reasoned that rules that
require local citizens to use locally provided government services—as
opposed to services provided by local private firms—do not involve the sort
of “protectionism” that triggers strict dormant Commerce Clause review. 12
At the least, the Court explained, states enjoy this form of state-selfpromotion immunity when they favor themselves in carrying out such

9 See infra notes 79–95 & accompanying text (discussing effect on tax cases); notes
98–102 & accompanying text (discussing effect on the Court’s seminal ruling in the
Baldwin case); notes 107–09 & accompanying text (discussing effect on downstreamrestraint cases such as South-Central Timber); notes 96–99 & accompanying text
(discussing effect on potential monopoly limitation on the market-participant doctrine);
notes 127–30 & accompanying text (discussing distinction between traditional and
nontraditional state activity in applying the market-participant exception); notes 132–38
& accompanying text (discussing effect on use of Pike balancing test in state-selfpromotion cases).
10 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 347 (2007).
11 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
12 United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 343. For discussion on United Haulers and its
relation to the Court’s earlier Carbone decision, see generally Brannon P. Denning,
Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 469–76
(2008); Kenneth L. Karst, From Carbone to United Haulers: The Advocates’ Tales, 2007
SUP. CT. REV. 237; Kylie M. Dummett, Note, Carbone v. United Haulers: Local
Environmental Regulation Gains Headway While the United States Supreme Court
“Trashes” Judicial Precedence, 12 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 185 (2008).
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“traditional government activities” as waste disposal. 13 Simply put, the Court
in United Haulers concluded that discrimination for dormant Commerce
Clause purposes is not present when a state acts only to “benefit a clearly
public facility, while treating all private companies exactly the same.” 14
In Part III-A of his opinion in Davis, Justice Souter relied on this
principle to validate Kentucky’s tax break for income produced by in-state,
but only in-state, public bonds. 15 United Haulers controlled, in the view of a
majority of the Court, because Kentucky had advantaged only itself when it
established special tax rules for municipal bonds, while treating in identical
fashion all other participants in the bond market. 16 Indeed, the result in Davis
“follow[ed] a fortiori” from United Haulers because—even more so than the
operation of waste transfer stations—“the issuance of debt securities to pay
for public projects is a quintessentially public function, with [a] venerable
history . . . .” 17 Justice Souter emphasized that “any notion of discrimination
assumes a comparison of substantially similar entities.” 18 He went on to
declare that a state involved in raising revenue to support its own operations
“does not have to treat itself as being ‘substantially similar’ to the other bond
issuers in the market.” 19
13 United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 334.
14 Id. at 342.
15 Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1810–11 (2008).
16 Id. at 1811. The term “municipal bonds” is commonly—and loosely—used to

describe all bonds issued by a state and any subunit of a state, including but not limited to
municipalities. In this Essay, the terms “municipal bonds” and “public bonds” are used
interchangeably.
17 Id. at 1810–11 (noting that, for this reason, the “apprehension in United Haulers
about ‘unprecedented . . . interference’ with a traditional government function is just as
warranted here”).
18 Id. at 1811 (quoting United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 342).
19 Id. Davis has triggered much scholarly analysis. Some treatments predated the
decision. See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, The Tax Exemption for Home State Bonds, Misguided
Though It May Be, Should Not Be Considered to Violate the Dormant Commerce Clause,
A.B.A. SEC. OF TAX’N NEWS Q., Winter 2007, at 11; Robert J. Firestone, Davis v.
Kentucky: A Logical Application of the Market Participant Doctrine, 46 ST. TAX NOTES
237 (2007); Bradley W. Joondeph, Practical Consequences, Institutional Competence,
and the Kentucky Bond Case, 46 ST. TAX NOTES 267 (2007); Joel Michael, Kentucky v.
Davis: Implications for State Tax and Debt Policy and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
45 ST. TAX NOTES 753 (2007); Alan D. Viard, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Balkanization of the Municipal Bond Market, 46 ST. TAX NOTES 241 (2007); Edward A.
Zelinsky, Davis v. Department of Revenue: The Incoherence of Dormant Commerce
Clause Nondiscrimination, 44 ST. TAX NOTES 941, 942–44 (2007); Adam Pekor, Note,
Department of Revenue v. Davis: Why the Supreme Court Should Strike Down the
Differential Tax Treatment of In-State and Out-of-State Municipal Bonds, 60 TAX. LAW
807, 814 (2007). Other treatments came in the wake of the Davis ruling. See, e.g., 1
JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 4.13[2][e] (3d ed.
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The Court’s reasoning in Part III-A is not immune from criticism, 20 but
identifying shortcomings in that analysis goes beyond the purposes of this
Essay. Instead, this Essay focuses on Part III-B, in which Justice Souter
shifted attention away from a direct application of United Haulers to the
construction of an alternative defense of the Kentucky tax exemption based
on the market-participant doctrine. 21 That alternative defense, as the ensuing
analysis shows, is rife with difficulties.

II. DAVIS AND THE MARKET-PARTICIPANT DOCTRINE
In the first sentence of Part III-B, Justice Souter posited that “[t]his case,
like United Haulers, may also be seen under the broader rubric of the market
participation doctrine . . . .” 22 In support of this pronouncement, Justice
Souter first asserted that the State had engaged in both market participation
(by issuing bonds) and market regulation (by imposing a discriminatory
tax). 23 He then expressed concern that the challengers of the Kentucky
exemption had erred in focusing solely on the regulatory features of
Kentucky’s behavior. 24 According to Justice Souter, the Davises had ignored
2000 & Supp. 2008); Jennifer Carr & Cara Griffith, Was Davis Outcome-Based
Jurisprudence?, 48 ST. TAX NOTES 663 (2008); Dolores W. Gregory, A Contrarian’s
View of the Holding in Kentucky v. Davis: Opening the Door to ‘Economic
Balkanization’ in the States, 15 MULTISTATE TAX REP. 372 (2008); Eugene W. Harper,
Jr., Davis Redivivus: The Futility of Utility, 119 TAX NOTES 1276 (2008); Steve R.
Johnson, What Davis Means for Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, 48 ST. TAX
NOTES 877 (2008); The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV.
276 (2008); Alan D. Viard, Letter to the Editor, Selective Private Activity Bond
Exemption Issue Still Unresolved, 119 TAX NOTES 1017 (2008); Alan D. Viard, U.S.
Supreme Court Upholds Balkanization for Some, but Not All, Bonds, 48 ST. TAX NOTES
889 (2008).
20 See, e.g., Coenen, Where United Haulers Might Take Us, supra note 8, at 19–22
(identifying ways in which the Court’s ruling in Davis went beyond its ruling in United
Haulers); Brian D. Galle & Ethan Yale, Can Discriminatory State Taxation of Municipal
Bonds Be Justified?, 117 ST. TAX NOTES 153 (2007) (stating the same reasoning); Ethan
Yale & Brian Galle, Muni Bonds and the Commerce Clause After United Haulers, 115
ST. TAX NOTES 1037, 1038 (2007) (stating, prior to the Court’s decision in Davis, that if
the facts of United Haulers were held to control, it would be a “significant extension of
[the] ‘state-run business’ exception” from that case). But see Julie Muething, Comment
and Casenote, An Analysis of the Disparate Tax Treatment of Municipal Bonds:
Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1711, 1732–33 (2007)
(arguing, prior to Davis, that Supreme Court should uphold Kentucky’s disparate tax
treatment of municipal bonds under United Haulers).
21 Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1811–14 (2008).
22 Id. at 1811.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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the critical fact that “regulation by taxation here goes hand in hand with
market participation by selling bonds.” 25 More particularly, Justice Souter
claimed that upholding the discriminatory tax because of its linkage to the
State’s marketing of bonds reflected a logical application of the Court’s
market-participant precedents, particularly Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp. 26 and White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers,
Inc. 27 Indeed, in Justice Souter’s view, “Alexandria Scrap[] and White can be
followed only by rejecting the Davises’ argument that Kentucky’s regulatory
activity should be viewed in isolation as Commerce Clause
discrimination.” 28
Justice Souter made three questionable moves in constructing the
market-participant analysis outlined in the preceding paragraph. First, he put
forward the surprising suggestion that United Haulers is properly viewed as a
market-participant case. 29 Second, he greatly overstated the relevance of the
Court’s market-participant precedents to the issue presented in Davis. 30
Third, he set forth an analysis that opens the door to both confusion and error
in future applications of the dormant Commerce Clause. These risks arise in
part because Justice Souter propounded a new and perplexing analytical
rhetoric for this field of law. Worse yet, adoption of his approach would
threaten long-recognized principles that lie at the heart of the Court’s
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.

A. Part III-B and the Miscasting of United Haulers
Justice Souter’s first error lay in his surprising suggestion that United
Haulers was—or at least should be viewed as—a market-participant case.
Indeed, Justice Souter opened his analysis in Part III-B by proclaiming that
“United Haulers[] may . . . be seen under the . . . rubric of the market
participation doctrine.” 31 This statement was curious in part because Justice
Souter elsewhere acknowledged that the Court in United Haulers had
resolved the case “independently of the market participation precedents” 32
and had not placed that ruling “under the market participant umbrella.” 33
These latter descriptions of the Court’s action in United Haulers were on
25 Id. at 1812.
26 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
27 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
28 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1814.
29 Id. at 1812.
30 Id. at 1813.
31 Id. at 1811.
32 Id. at 1809.
33 Id. at 1813.
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target because the controlling opinion in that case made no mention of the
market-participant rule, did not rely on the Court’s market-participant
precedents, employed a balancing analysis that does not operate in marketparticipant cases, 34 and never questioned the government defendants’
concession that the market-participant doctrine had no application to the
matter at hand. 35
Most importantly, the United Haulers majority acted in this manner
because the case did involve state market regulation of the purest sort. Under
the program challenged in United Haulers, the relevant localities had (1)
entered the market for the provision of waste disposal services by opening a
waste transfer facility and (2) also directly compelled every person within
those localities to buy waste services solely from that facility under the threat
of criminal fines and imprisonment. 36 While the first activity involved
market participation, the second activity involved a classic form of market
regulation because it coerced behavior by purely private economic actors;
indeed, the law at issue in United Haulers involved precisely the same form
of market regulation that the Court had invalidated as impermissibly
discriminatory in its earlier ruling in Carbone. 37
Confronted with this complication, Justice Souter advanced the idea in
Davis that even the starkest form of market regulation will escape the grip of
the dormant Commerce Clause when it “goes hand in hand” with a
permissible form of state market participation. 38 Contrary to Justice Souter’s
suggestion, however, the Court’s prior cases lent no support to this view. In
the seminal South Dakota cement plant case, Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 39 for
example, the Court spoke of the market-participant doctrine as vindicating

34 See infra notes 132–39 & accompanying text (discussing United Haulers and the
Pike balancing test).
35 See United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 360 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting the Governments’ concession that the
market-participant doctrine was inapplicable to that case).
36 Id. at 353–57.
37 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394–95 (1993); see
also Southcentral Pa. Waste Haulers Ass’n v. Bedford-Fulton-Huntingdon Solid Waste
Auth., 877 F. Supp. 935, 946 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (rejecting market-participant argument of
governmental waste-handling facility because flow-control policies reflect the
“regulatory powers [that government owners] possess as sovereigns [and] are not the
types of measures which private participants in the marketplace could implement”);
Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Se. Ala. Solid Waste Disposal Auth., 814 F. Supp. 1566, 1573
(M.D. Ala. 1993) (noting that the very term “flow control” indicates the city’s “primary
purpose is to ‘control,’ not participate in, the ‘flow’ of solid waste in the stream of
commerce”).
38 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1812.
39 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
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“the ability of the States themselves to operate freely in the free market.” 40
South Dakota did just that when it chose to favor in-state purchasers, to the
exclusion of would-be out-of-state purchasers, in selling cement produced by
a state-owned facility. 41 The Government in United Haulers, in contrast, was
not merely “operat[ing] freely in the free market” because it went beyond
simply identifying the subset of persons with whom it was willing to deal. 42
Instead, it stripped otherwise autonomous private traders of their ability to
operate “freely in the free market” by coercing them to deal only with it. 43
Indeed, in making this move, the Government not only regulated local waste
generators and handlers; it also regulated potential out-of-state competitors
by effectively stripping them of their preexisting liberty to sell their services
to private waste generators located within the jurisdiction. 44
Notwithstanding the inapplicability of the market-participant exception
in United Haulers, the majority in that case concluded that the State’s
coercive behavior should escape the sort of elevated scrutiny typically
applied to laws that discriminate against out-of-state commercial concerns. 45
The Court, however, made it clear that this ruling stemmed solely from a
proper understanding of which state regulations involve, and which do not
involve, problematic “discrimination.” 46 In other words, the Court in United
Haulers based the result in that case on a distinction drawn between
discrimination and nondiscrimination, rather than a distinction drawn
between market regulation and market participation. For this reason, Justice
Souter’s recasting of United Haulers as a market-participant case entailed a
radically revisionist treatment of that decision. It also invited a sweeping
reappraisal of which forms of state conduct can qualify for protection under
the market-participant doctrine.

B. Part III-B and a Misreading of the Market-Participant Precedents
A second flaw in Justice Souter’s market-participant analysis involved
his treatment of the Court’s market-participant precedents. In particular,
40 Id. at 437.
41 Id. at 432–33.
42 Id. at 437.
43 Id.
44 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.

330, 356 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that the State in Carbone “depriv[ed]
competitors, including out-of-state firms, of access to a local market” (quoting C & A
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994))).
45 550 U.S. at 346.
46 See supra notes 31–45 & accompanying text (reviewing the basis of Court’s
ruling in United Haulers).
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Justice Souter indicated that a failure to view Kentucky’s tax exemption and
bond sales as a unitary whole—and thus protected by the market-participant
exception—“would require overruling” the Court’s prior decisions in White
and Alexandria Scrap. 47 As to White, Justice Souter explained:
White . . . scrutinized a government acting in dual roles. The mayor of
Boston promulgated an executive order that bore the hallmarks of
regulation: it applied to every construction project funded wholly or
partially by city funds (or funds administered by the city), and it imposed
general restrictions on the hiring practices of private contractors, mandating
that 50% of their work forces be bona fide Boston residents and setting
thresholds for minorities (25%) and women (10%) as well . . . . After
speaking of “[t]he basic distinction . . . between States as market
participants and States as market regulators,” . . . White did not dissect
Boston’s conduct and ignore the former. Instead, the Court treated the
regulatory activity in favor of local and minority labor as terms or
conditions of the government’s efforts in its market role, which was treated
as dispositive. 48

There are many difficulties with this effort to portray White as relevant
to—if not dispositive of—the issue presented in Davis. 49 The essential
difficulty, however, is plain to see. In White, the city imposed neither a
47 Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1813 (2008). Even more exotic was
Justice Souter’s observation that “if the Davises had their way, . . . the market
participation doctrine would describe a null set (or maybe a set of one, see Reeves . . . ).”
Id. As we soon shall see, this statement is erroneous because non-application of the
market-participant doctrine in Davis is easily squared with its earlier application of that
doctrine in White and Alexandria Scrap. But, even if a refusal to apply the doctrine in
Davis would require overruling both White and Alexandria Scrap, the market-participant
doctrine would still operate in many cases, including cases far different from Reeves. See,
e.g., Am. Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla. 1972), aff’d, 409 U.S.
904 (1972) (validating the State’s discriminatory actions as a purchaser by way of a “buy
local” law).
48 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1813 (quoting White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers,
Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 207 (1982)).
49 One curiosity involved Justice Souter’s highlighting of Boston’s treatment of
minorities and women because that aspect of the city’s action was in no way at issue in
the White case. See id. Another curiosity involved Justice Souter’s suggestion that
embodiment of the city’s contracting requirements in an executive order with continuing
effect warranted characterizing those requirements as “regulatory” in nature. Id. It is not
unusual, after all, for private firms to establish ongoing policies (which may well be
formally promulgated by the firm’s chief executive officer) that define those persons with
whom the firm will contract. Banks, for example, often establish ongoing eligibility
requirements with respect to what prospective borrowers do and do not qualify for loans.
The establishment of such ongoing eligibility requirements by private firms, however,
would never be thought of as a form of “regulation.”
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forced-use rule (as in United Haulers) nor a discriminatory tax burden (as in
Davis). Rather, Boston (just like South Dakota in Reeves) simply declared
that it would engage in market transactions only with trading partners that
met certain government-specified conditions—most significantly, the
condition that hired contractors would ensure that 50% of all project workers
were city residents. 50 To be sure, the Court in White inquired whether the
city’s imposition of this condition qualified as market regulation because of
its effects on contracts entered into among privately-owned general
contractors, privately-owned subcontractors, and individual private
employees. 51 In the end, however, the Court concluded that the program in
White did not involve market regulation because all project workers were, “in
a substantial if informal sense, ‘working for the city,’” even if they were
technically on the payrolls of private firms. 52 And because the employment
of city workers by the city itself involved market participation—and not
market regulation—the Boston hiring preference presented no problem under
the dormant Commerce Clause. 53
Put another way, the Court perceived the key question in White to be
whether “the city is regulating the market rather than participating in it,” or
(to put the same point another way) “participating in the market, rather than
acting as a market regulator.” 54 It thus made no sense for Justice Souter to
suggest in Part III-B of Davis that the Court in White had “treated the
regulatory activity in favor of local . . . labor” as permissible because it was
“joined . . . intimately” with Boston’s participation in the market. 55 The
whole point of the Court’s analysis in White was that market participation
and market regulation are mutually exclusive categories, so that the marketparticipant exception by definition becomes inapplicable once it is
determined that market regulation is present. Any doubt in this regard was
removed by the Court’s follow-up decision in United Building &
Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 56 in which the Court
declared that the controlling consideration in White was that Boston had
acted “solely as a market participant.” 57
50 White, 460 U.S. at 205 n.1.
51 See id. at 211 n.7 (addressing Justice Blackmun’s argument in dissent that the

case involved state action that “regulates employment contracts”).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 210 (emphasis added); id. at 207 (emphasis added).
55 Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1813–14 (2008).
56 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
57 Id. at 220 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Court went on to justify the marketparticipant rule by reasoning that “[t]he Commerce Clause acts as an implied restraint
upon state regulatory powers,” so that “[w]hen the State acts solely as a market
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Another reason for concluding that White provided no meaningful
guidance as to the proper analysis in Davis is that White and Davis involved
fundamentally different dormant Commerce Clause issues. White presented
the question of whether Boston had reached through its immediate
contractual relationship with general contractors to impose an impermissible
“downstream regulation” regarding its general contractors’ and
subcontractors’ relationships with other private parties. 58 Davis, however,
did not involve anything resembling a downstream regulation because
Kentucky simply afforded a tax break to people who held Kentucky bonds,
irrespective of the market relationships those bondholders had with any
private party. 59 In short, White was a case about the downstream-regulation
limit on the market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause
rule. Davis, in contrast, was a case about whether a particular form of
discriminatory taxation should be treated like other forms of discriminatory
taxation for purposes of Commerce Clause restraints. As Part III-A of the
Souter opinion made clear, the discriminatory-tax issue lay in the shadow of
United Haulers. 60 It did not, however, bear any close kinship to the issue
presented in White.
Justice Souter also missed the mark when he invoked Alexandria Scrap
as a proper progenitor of his newfangled market-regulation/marketparticipation linkage-based approach. In Alexandria Scrap, the Court upheld
a Maryland program that had two key features. First, the State paid cash
bounties for the processing of junk cars so as to remove eyesores from the
Maryland landscape. 61 Second, the State created an advantage for local firms
in accessing these state-made payments by imposing stricter documentation
requirements on out-of-state junk car handlers than on their in-state

participant, no conflict between state regulation and federal regulatory authority can
arise.” Id. But of course, if a state is acting as both a market participant and a market
regulator, then a conflict between state regulation and federal regulatory authority can
arise. See also id. at 219 (recapitulating the “distinction between the city acting as a
market participant and the city acting as a market regulator”).
58 S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 99 (1984). Downstream
restraints, according to one account, are restraints placed by one entity in the production
to distribution chain with regard to other entities that “perform functions closer to end
use.” Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 6, at 77 n.25; see also Coenen, Untangling the
Market-Participant Exemption, supra note 6, at 465–73 (exploring downstream restraints
in White and other cases).
59 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1805. The downstream restraint doctrine might apply if, for
example, Kentucky afforded tax breaks only to persons who purchased state bonds
through an in-state broker.
60 See supra notes 15–20 & accompanying text.
61 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 797 (1976).
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counterparts. 62 In Davis, Justice Souter claimed that Alexandria Scrap, like
White, supported a view of the market-participant doctrine that authorizes
discriminatory regulation if that regulation is part and parcel of the state’s
market participation. 63 As he put the point:
[I]n Alexandria Scrap, Maryland employed the tools of regulation to
invigorate its participation in the market for automobile hulks. The specific
controversy there was over documentation requirements included in a
“comprehensive statute designed to speed up the scrap cycle.” Superficially,
the scheme was regulatory in nature; but the Court’s decision was premised
on its view that, in practical terms, Maryland had not only regulated but had
also “entered into the market itself to bid up [the] price” of automobile
hulks. 64

As with his description of White, Justice Souter’s description of
Alexandria Scrap gives insufficient attention to the actual words and real
reasoning of the case. To begin with, the “comprehensive” nature of
Maryland’s statutory scheme 65 was beside the point in Alexandria Scrap. In
fact, the Court focused its attention on whether the discriminatory
documentation requirement, standing alone, violated the dormant Commerce
Clause, so that the “comprehensive” treatment of junk cars did not bear on
the Court’s analysis at all. 66 Of even greater significance, the Court in
Alexandria Scrap in no way suggested that “Maryland had not only regulated
but had also ‘entered into the market itself . . . . ’” 67 Rather, the Court was
emphatic in declaring that “Maryland has not sought . . . to regulate the
conditions under which [the flow of junk cars] may occur. Instead, it has
entered into the market itself to bid up their price.” 68 Thus, in Alexandria
Scrap—just as in White—the linchpin of the Court’s analysis was that the
State had acted only as a market-participant, and not as a market regulator, by

62 Id. at 800–01.
63 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1814.
64 Id. at 1813 (citations omitted).
65 Id.
66 See Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 803–05 (discussing whether the statutory

amendment that added the documentation requirement was “the kind of action with
which the Commerce Clause [was] concerned”).
67 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1813 (emphasis added) (quoting Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S.
at 806).
68 See Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 806 (emphasis added). In the same vein, the
Court added that Maryland had not “interfered with the natural functioning of the
interstate market . . . through burdensome regulation.” Id.
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spending its own money in a way that favored in-state traders. 69 There was
no suggestion that the Court viewed Maryland’s choice of favored trading
partners as a form of regulation that escaped constitutional extermination
because of its nexus to separately identified market participation by way of
the payment of cash bounties. Rather, the Court—with a solid grounding in
conventional understandings—viewed the overall behavior of Maryland in
both making payments and stipulating the conditions on which those
payments would be made as companion elements of market participation. 70
In fairness to Justice Souter, it is not unreasonable to describe White and
Alexandria Scrap as cases that involve state regulation. Many economists,
for example, view government subsidy programs, including the one at issue
in Alexandria Scrap, as “regulatory” in nature because in purpose and effect
they shape private marketplace behavior. 71 In like fashion, the State’s efforts
to induce the hiring of state residents by private firms in White could be seen
as the very “essence of regulation.” 72 In fact, Justice Blackmun—in a
passage written in the White case and quoted with enthusiasm in Part III-B of
the Davis opinion—described the Boston program in exactly those terms. 73
The important point, however, is that Justice Blackmun wrote those words in
a dissenting opinion. The majority in White, like the majority in Alexandria
Scrap, took a foundationally different approach to the case. In the view of
both of those majorities, the State had not engaged in regulatory action, but
“solely” in marketplace behavior. 74 Thus, it is inaccurate in the extreme to
say that the market-participant doctrine applied in either instance because the
69 See also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980) (explaining that the
Court in Alexandria Scrap “characterized Maryland as a market participant, rather than as
a market regulator”).
70 See supra note 49 & accompanying text (discussing common business practice of
private firms to establish eligibility requirements as they operate in the market).
71 See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
107 YALE L.J. 965, 1014 (1998) [hereinafter Coenen, Business Subsidies] (noting that
“the very purpose of subsidization is to regulate the flow of business by promoting instate production”); Michael J. Pollele, A Critique of the Market Participation Exception,
15 WHITTIER L. REV. 647, 658 (1994) (“It is no more logical to say that a state has
entered the market as a real buyer or seller when it uses subsidies than when it uses its
normal regulatory powers to manipulate an existing market.”); see also Gergen, supra
note 6, at 1144 (“If downstream restraints are different from subsidies in any real respect,
it is because their costs are hidden.”).
72 White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 219 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73 Id. The Justice stated: “The power to dictate to another those with whom he may
deal is viewed with suspicion and closely limited in the context of purely private
economic relations. When exercised by government, such a power is the essence of
regulation.” Id.
74 See supra note 57 & accompanying text (quoting United Building).
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Court
had
concluded
that
the
Government’s
“commercial
activities . . . and . . . regulatory efforts complemented each other.” 75

C. Part III-B and Dormant Commerce Clause Dangers
The foregoing discussion reveals how Justice Souter steered off course in
dealing with key Commerce Clause precedents in Part III-B of his Davis
opinion. It may be, however, that his analytical miscues concerned only
technical matters, so that the preceding discussion embodies only doctrinal
hair-splitting of no practical importance. Do the flaws of Part III-B pose
genuine risks of harm to dormant Commerce Clause law? The answer to that
question is an emphatic “yes” because Justice Souter’s market-participant
reasoning poses three significant dangers. First, that analysis involves a
deeply problematic recrafting of the basic rhetoric of market-participant
analysis. Second, there exists a serious risk that this new rhetoric will reshape
dormant Commerce Clause decision-making in undesirable ways. Third, an
embrace of Justice Souter’s methodology would at least inject new and farreaching doctrinal uncertainties into this field of law.

1. Market-Participant Rhetoric
Prior analysis reveals two basic points about Part III-B. First, Justice
Souter stood ready to uphold Kentucky’s discriminatory taxing scheme under
the market-participant rubric, even after characterizing the challenged State
action as involving market regulation. 76 Second, Justice Souter saw no
problem in making this move even though the Court had previously applied
the exception only after concluding that the relevant state activity did not
involve market regulation, but only market participation. 77
The conclusion properly distilled from these two points is that Part III-B
in effect advances a dramatically new style of rhetoric for evaluating the
application of the market-participant doctrine. Under this new rhetoric,
discriminatory behavior can qualify for market-participant immunity, even
when viewed as a form of market regulation. To be sure, in the view of
Justice Souter, a discriminatory regulation can claim that immunity only if it
is linked in a meaningful way to market participation. Also, to be sure,
Justice Souter would be quick to insist that this meaningful-linkage
requirement will counteract overuse of the market-participant exception—
75 Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1813 (2008).
76 Id. at 1812–13.
77 See supra notes 49–57 & accompanying text (describing Court’s perception of
absence of market regulation in White); notes 67–70 & accompanying text (describing
Court’s perception of the absence of market regulation in Alexandria Scrap).
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and resulting dilution of the dormant Commerce Clause principle—under the
rhetoric he proposes.
Even so, words matter. And the shift in rhetoric that lies at the heart of
Justice Souter’s Part III-B analysis would exert a gravitational pull in the
direction of expanding the market-participant exception if it were embraced
by the Court. Simply stated, a newly formulated rule that sometimes permits
market regulation to qualify for a market-participant-based immunity must
reach further than the existing rule, which categorically forecloses the
application of that immunity to any form of market regulation. The rhetoric
of rules always shapes their operation. And Justice Souter’s new rhetoric, in
its very nature, invites an expansion of the market-participant exception and
a reciprocal contraction of the otherwise operative scope of the dormant
Commerce Clause rule.

2. Market-Participant Mischief
Just how would an endorsement of Justice Souter’s new marketparticipant rhetoric affect dormant Commerce Clause decision-making? The
opaqueness of Justice Souter’s Part III-B analysis precludes any certain
answer to this question. 78 There can be no doubt, however, that that analysis
threatens to alter the dormant Commerce Clause landscape in important
ways. In particular, that analysis could well (a) lead to troubling shifts in the
Court’s traditional tax-discrimination jurisprudence, (b) alter results in
market regulation cases as well, and (c) greatly expand the practical
operation of the state-self-promotion principle first recognized in United
Haulers and again applied in Part III-A of Davis.

a. Dormant Commerce Clause Tax Law
In Part III-B of his Davis opinion, Justice Souter became the first
member of the Court ever to suggest that some forms of discriminatory tax
relief could find shelter under the “rubric of the market participation
doctrine.” 79 This analytical move may provide a new opening for those who
78 See infra notes 142–43 & accompanying text (touching on the range of questions

raised by Part III-B).
79 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811; see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 592–93 (1997) (finding market-participant exemption
inapplicable to Maine law providing tax break to charitable organizations who catered to
in-state residents); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988) (“A tax
exemption is not the sort of direct state involvement in the market that falls within the
market-participation doctrine.”); cf. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273
(1984) (invalidating tax exemption for locally produced spirits without even considering
the market-participant doctrine).
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have advocated dramatic revisions of dormant Commerce Clause tax law.
Why? In part, because one leading critic, Professor Edward A. Zelinsky, has
vigorously argued that local-industry-supporting tax exemptions, credits, and
deductions (which historically have been invalidated) should be treated no
differently than local-industry-supporting affirmative monetary subsidies
(which historically have been upheld, including in Alexandria Scrap). 80 The
centerpiece of Professor Zelinsky’s analysis is that the economic effects of
state monetary payments and so-called tax expenditures are functionally
identical, so that there is no good reason to attach to them different legal
effects. 81 In particular, building on Justice Souter’s analysis in Part III-B,
Professor Zelinsky might say something like this:
Taxation may have a regulatory dimension, but tax relief is a subsidy, and
thus a form of market participation. Justice Souter has said that the marketparticipant exception can apply when state market participation is linked to
state market regulation. And under that principle, subsidy-like tax relief—
which in practical effect involves just as much market participation as the

80 See Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” Constitutionally Equivalent to

Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 379, 391 (1998); Edward A. Zelinsky,
Restoring Politics to the Commerce Clause: The Case for Abandoning the Dormant
Commerce Clause Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 29, 30,
34 (2002) (asserting that because “tax credits may be identical to direct outlay subsidies”
and because this fact adds great confusion and inconsistency to the dormant Commerce
Clause, the Court needs to abandon the anti-discrimination principle in the context of
state taxes); Edward A. Zelinsky, Ohio Incentives Decision Revisited, 108 TAX NOTES
1569, 1571 (Sept. 26, 2005) (seeking to rebut argument that subsidies are more tolerable
because of the increased “legislative scrutiny” of them). But see Brannon P. Denning, Is
the Dormant Commerce Clause Expendable? A Response to Edward Zelinksy, 77 MISS.
L.J. 623, 636 (2007) (urging that “the differential treatment by the Court of taxes and
subsidies [is not] inconsistent or incoherent”).
81 See Zelinsky, Restoring Politics, supra note 80, at 51; see also Chem. Waste
Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 351 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (viewing
subsidies as equivalent to tax breaks); Fireside Nissan, Inc. v. Fanning, 30 F.3d 206, 216
(1st Cir. 1994) (detecting no practical difference between a tax break afforded to certain
industries and “a ‘direct’ cash subsidy to those same industries”); Carlson v. State, 798
P.2d 1269, 1278 (Alaska 1990) (positing that paying out cash subsidies to in-staters
seems “economically indistinguishable from imposing a facially equal tax on residents
and nonresidents while making it effectively unequal by a system of credits and
exemptions”); COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 297 (noting that “as an
economic matter” direct subsidies and tax exemptions and expenditures are “functionally
indistinguishable”); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 705, 717 (1970) (“A dollar is a dollar—both for the person who receives it and the
government that pays it, whether the dollar comes with a tax credit label or a direct
expenditure label.”).
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subsidy program involved in Alexandria Scrap—should fall outside the
dormant Commerce Clause rule.

The difficulty with this subsidy-is-like-tax-break approach is that it
threatens to create a dormant Commerce Clause “exception” large enough to
drive a truck through. 82 In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 83 for example, the
Court invalidated an exemption from Hawaii’s wholesale liquor tax that was
claimable only by vendors of locally manufactured fruit wine. 84 Under the
reasoning laid out above, however, the Court should have detected no
constitutional problem because the tax break generated exactly the same
financial consequences for the favored sellers that a legally unobjectionable
affirmative monetary subsidy for those same sellers would have produced.
Indeed, even protective tariffs may be seen as embodying a subsidy-like form
of tax expenditure. After all, when a state taxes the in-state transfer or
movement of only out-of-state goods, it might be viewed as taxing all goods,
both in-state and out-of-state, while providing a subsidy-like tax exemption
for in-state products. If the Court were to uphold tariffs on this ground,
however, it would stand the dormant Commerce Clause on its head because
tariffs represent the “paradigmatic example” of laws that abridge the
constitutional principle of economic union. 85
Without explicitly saying so, the Court in the past has dealt with this
tension by drawing an unbreachable line between tax breaks (which have
been automatically characterized as regulatory for dormant Commerce
Clause purposes) and affirmative payments (which have been automatically
characterized as non-regulatory and thus properly assimilated to market
participation). 86 Justice Souter’s approach threatens to erase this line—or at
least to blur it greatly—even though, as I have explained at length elsewhere,
82 See Denning, supra note 80, at 626 (suggesting that, if taken to its logical end,
Zelinsky’s “critique and his solution . . . means the end” of the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine itself).
83 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
84 Id. at 275–76. The exemption also extended to sellers of okolehao, a brandy
distilled from the root of an indigenous Hawaiian shrub. Id. at 265.
85 W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994); see also Richard B.
Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 80 (1988)
(citing tariffs as the “paradigm examples” of “categorical discrimination” barred by the
Commerce Clause).
86 See W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194, 201 (invalidating State subsidy that
operated as a de facto tax rebate or refund, even while seeming to recognize that
freestanding subsidies are unobjectionable); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,
277 (1988) (invalidating sales tax credit provided to in-state producers of ethanol while
distinguishing as permissible a direct subsidy for in-state producers); see also Williams,
supra note 6, at 479 (“To date, the Court has yet to uphold a discriminatory tax
exemption or credit.”).
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that line comports with powerful historical and political-process
considerations. 87 To be sure, Justice Souter’s opinion purported to leave
undisturbed the Court’s past tax-discrimination cases, which he distinguished
from Davis on the ground that the tax breaks previously struck down by the
Court favored private firms instead of the Government itself. 88 But one can
only wonder whether that distinction can endure, and how it will operate in
practice, in light of Justice Souter’s ambitious recrafting of the marketparticipant doctrine.
The cause for wonder is heightened by Justice Souter’s treatment of
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison 89 in footnote 17 of
his opinion. 90 In that case, the Court struck down a property tax break
afforded by Maine to non-profit entities that directed most or all of their
services to State residents. 91 According to Justice Souter, this form of
discriminatory tax relief differed from the tax break at issue in Davis for the
following reason:
In Camps Newfound, the tax exemption was unaccompanied by any market
activity by the State; it favored only private charitable institutions. We
correctly rejected the argument that a tax exemption without more
constitutes market participation. But we had no occasion to consider the
scheme here, where a State employs a tax exemption to facilitate its own
participation in the market. 92

This passage raises a host of questions about when a discriminatory state
tax break operates “without more” to favor “only” private entities and about
whether the proper touchstone for review in hybrid marketparticipation/market-regulation cases is a strict “without more” test. Would
the Maine tax break be permissible if, for example, the State itself had sold
supplies or leased real estate to the resident-favoring entities involved in the
Camps Newfound/Owatonna case? What if the State had contracted to pay
fees on behalf of some users of the non-profit entities’ services, and the tax
relief helped to ensure that those services would remain available? What if
87 See, e.g., Coenen, Business Subsidies, supra note 71, at 969 (“[F]our
considerations—rooted in form, fairness, federalism, and political processes—render
subsidies less threatening to Commerce Clause values than economically comparable tax
deductions, credits, and exemptions.”); see also GEOFFERY R. STONE ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 300 (2d ed. 1991) (noting that outright subsidies have greater
“political visibility” than tax expenditures or exemptions).
88 Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1813–14 (2008).
89 520 U.S. 564, 585 (1996).
90 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1814 n.17.
91 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 564.
92 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1814 n.17.
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the State both granted tax breaks to and affirmatively subsidized residentpreferring nonprofits? In any such case, it could not be said that “a tax
exemption without more” was at work or that “the tax exemption was
unaccompanied by any market activity by the State.” 93 It follows that these
forms of linkage between state taxation and state market participation might
trigger application of the market-participant exception under the view of
Justice Souter. 94 At the very least, Part III-B of his opinion does not
foreclose such an outcome. Any such result, however, would plow new
doctrinal ground by departing from the “cardinal rule” that “[n]o state,
consistent with the Commerce Clause, may ‘impose a tax which
discriminates against interstate commerce . . . by providing a direct
commercial advantage to local business.’” 95

b. Dormant Commerce Clause Regulatory Law
The dormant Commerce Clause operates in two separate hemispheres—
one occupied by state and local tax laws and one occupied by non-tax
regulatory measures. 96 As we have just seen, Part III-B could open the door
to a significant reformulation of how the dormant Commerce Clause operates
in tax cases. 97 No less important, Justice Souter’s market-participant analysis
could disrupt settled jurisprudence in the state-regulation arena.
In Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 98 for example, the Court invalidated a
New York law that established minimum wholesale prices for all locally sold
milk, as applied to the products of out-of-state dairy farmers. The Court’s
concern was that this regulatory intervention had effects that paralleled those
of protective tariffs. 99 The difficulty was that the measure, by equalizing
prices, deprived out-of-state producers of efficiency-generated opportunities
to undersell in-state competitors. 100 In reflecting on Baldwin in Part III-B,
Justice Souter noted that “[s]tates that regulated the price of milk did not
93 See supra notes 91–92 & accompanying text.
94 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1812.
95 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 268 (1984) (quoting Boston Stock

Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977) and Nw. States Portland Cement
Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959)).
96 See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, State User Fees and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 50
VAND. L. REV. 795, 808–09 (1997) (describing these two categories of cases and
outlining the different doctrinal approaches taken to them by the Court).
97 See supra notes 79–95 & accompanying text.
98 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
99 Id. at 521–22; see also W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193–94 (1994)
(discussing the Baldwin decision).
100 See W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194 (stating that minimum-price regulation
neutralized “the advantage possessed by lower cost out-of-state producers”).
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keep herds of cows or compete against dairy producers for the dollars of milk
drinkers.” 101 Did the plurality mean to suggest that Baldwin would have
come out differently if local governments had owned herds? Any number of
herds? A substantial number of herds? Even if the tariff-like effects of the
challenged pricing scheme would have been the same as in Baldwin with
respect to shielding local private herd owners from out-of-state competition?
It is noteworthy in this regard that Justice Souter stressed that “[t]he
Commonwealth enacted its tax code with an eye toward making some or all
of its bonds more marketable.” 102 If a state in similar fashion passes a
minimum price rule for the specific purpose of making its own milk “more
marketable,” will its program withstand a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge even though it simultaneously protects local private milk producers
from competitive challenges posed by out-of-state farmers?
An apologist for Justice Souter might criticize the foregoing analysis as
unduly alarmist. 103 The some-herds-are-owned-by-the-state hypothetical, so
the argument goes, is easily distinguished from Davis on the ground that a
minimum-price rule would give a leg up not only to the state’s own
commerce, but to private in-state commercial actors as well. 104 This
observation, however, simply ignores the all-important question. That
question concerns how far Part III-B of the Souter opinion goes beyond Part
III-A in safeguarding hybridized state commercial and regulatory activity
from dormant Commerce Clause attack. In the end, an endorsement of the
protean linkage principle put forward in Part III-B creates an issue in every
case as to how much linkage justifies how much discrimination whenever
state regulation and state commercial activities are conjoined.
Another illustration of this difficulty comes from South-Central Timber
Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke. 105 There the Court confronted the question
whether Alaska could condition sales of its timber on the buyer’s agreement
to process that timber within the State. 106 In invalidating Alaska’s action, a
four-Justice plurality deemed the market-participant exception inapplicable
on the ground that the State was working through a transaction made in one
market (that is, the market for timber sales) to effectively “regulate” activity
in another market (that is, the market for timber processing) by way of a
101 Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1812 (2008) (internal citations

omitted).
102 Id. at 1814.
103 Indeed, Justice Souter might well level such a criticism himself. See id. at 1819
(describing as “alarmism” dissenters’ expression of concern that validating Kentucky’s
differential tax scheme would undermine the purposes of the Commerce Clause).
104 Id. at 1812.
105 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
106 Id. at 84.
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contractual condition. 107 In Justice Souter’s view, however, affixation of the
“regulation” label to this set of facts would not foreclose application of the
market-participant doctrine. 108 Indeed, he might well say that an overruling
of South-Central Timber should follow a fortiori from United Haulers. Part
III-B indicates, after all, that Justice Souter stood ready to validate under the
market-participant doctrine even the fully coercive state regulation at issue in
United Haulers due to its linkage to state sales of waste services. 109 Thus, it
is hard to see why he would not even more readily validate the non-coercive
form of state regulation imposed by way of a mere contractual condition in a
case like South-Central Timber. It bears emphasis that this line of reasoning
would have effects that reach well beyond the overruling of South-Central
Timber itself. It would require abandonment of any sort of “downstream
restraint” limitation on the market-participant exception because every
application of that limitation involves invalidation of a de facto regulation
imposed by way of mere contractual condition.
Justice Souter’s approach would raise other questions as well. In a case
of no small interest to California football fans, for example, a state court held
that the market-participant exception did not shelter an exercise of the
eminent domain power to keep the Oakland Raiders in Oakland. 110 Would
Justice Souter reject this result? Perhaps he would because there can be no
doubt that the Government’s regulatory move in compelling a sale went
“hand in hand” with its attempted marketplace act of buying the Raiders
franchise. 111
107 See id. at 97 (concluding that the “market regulator” label applied because “[t]he
limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that it allows a State to impose burdens
on commerce within the market in which it is a participant, but allows it to go no
further”). See generally Polelle, supra note 71, at 675–76 (expressing concerns regarding
downstream restraints because of restrictions placed on otherwise free trade in the free
market); Williams, supra note 6, at 510–17 (broadly exploring “downstream restraint”
concept while noting that “the constitutionality of downstream restraints is a complex
question” not susceptible to “categorical answers”).
108 See supra note 38 & accompanying text.
109 See supra note 31 & accompanying text.
110 See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985). The trial court had found that the City of Oakland’s attempt to force a sale of the
Oakland Raiders franchise had violated the dormant Commerce Clause. See id. at 154. As
a defense, the City of Oakland argued on appeal that their purchase of the Oakland
Raiders franchise fell within the market-participant exception. The California Court of
Appeal found that the market-participant exception did not apply because the city’s
action did not involve a voluntary transaction, but instead a sale coerced by way of the
power of eminent domain. Id. at 156.
111 Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1812 (2008). An intriguing question
is whether, apart from the market-participant exception, the state-self-promotion principle
of United Haulers would shelter Oakland’s action, despite the blockade it put on the
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In another line of cases, lower courts have suggested that there exists a
monopoly exception to the market-participant doctrine. 112 On this view, for
example, Reeves might well come out differently if the would-be Wyoming
cement buyer could show that there existed no market substitutes for South
Dakota’s state-made product or opportunity to create market substitutes due

franchise’s interstate sale. United Haulers may control because it shares a key feature
with the Oakland Raiders case: in both settings, the municipality forced local traders to
deal with it, thus thwarting the possibility of engaging in commerce across state lines. See
supra notes 36–37 & accompanying text. One possible distinction is that condemnation
of a football team does not, like a garbage regulation, involve a “traditional government
activity.” See supra note 13 & accompanying text (quoting United Haulers Ass’n v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 334 (2007)). There is,
however, no “traditional functions” limit on the operation of the market-participant
doctrine. See infra notes 125–28 & accompanying text. In short, under Justice Souter’s
approach, the regulation at issue in Oakland Raiders might well escape constitutional
invalidation under that doctrine even if it would not be carried to safety by United
Haulers.
112 See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica, 830 F.2d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir.
1987) (reiterating monopoly exception to market-participant exemption while declining
to apply that exception to an incomplete monopoly); W. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Cory, 726
F.2d 1340, 1343 (9th Cir. 1984), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided Court, 471 U.S.
81 (1985) (deeming market-participant exception inapplicable to the State as lessor,
where “practical considerations” rendered lessees unable to “shop around” so that the
State “has complete monopoly over the sites used by the oil companies” and “companies
have no choice”). But see Four T’s v. Little Rock Mun. Airport Comm’n, 108 F.3d 909,
912–13 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying market-participant exception to state concession fees
charged to rental car companies despite Commission’s monopoly on those spaces);
Chance Mgmt. v. South Dakota, 97 F.3d 1107, 1114 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding South
Dakota law permitting licenses for video lottery to be granted only to corporations that
have a majority of shares held by South Dakota residents by applying market-participant
exception and rejecting argument that exception does not apply where the state has a
monopoly); Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1212 (D.R.I. 1987) (“While
Rhode Island admittedly holds a monopoly in landfill services, I can see no distinction
between this monopoly and the monopoly the State and its municipalities hold in
education services, or in police and fire protection.”); cf. Barbara J. Redman, The Market
Regulator-Market Participant Distinction and Supreme Court Vigilance over
Discriminatory State Programs: Does Economic Theory Justify the Judicial Effort?, 25
AM. BUS. L.J. 585, 590 (1988) (“In an economic sense, a monopolist may be regarded as
a participant in the market it monopolizes . . . .”). See generally Polelle, supra note 71, at
675–76 (“Several lower courts have concluded that, to the extent a governmental unit
engages in monopolistic activities that would run afoul of the antitrust laws if committed
by private businesses, the market participation doctrine should not apply.”); Williams,
supra note 6, at 506–11 (advocating monopoly limitation to the market-participant
exception).
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to South Dakota’s monopoly position. 113 Would Justice Souter agree? On
one view, his analysis should foreclose recognition of any monopoly
exception to the market-participant doctrine. After all, Justice Souter stood
ready to affix the market-participant label to the rule at issue in United
Haulers 114 even though that rule vested a monopoly position in a state entity
by mandating that all local citizens deal with it and no one else. 115 It should
follow, according to this reasoning, that there can be no monopoly exception
to the market-participant rule because the essential holding of United
Haulers is to uphold a government monopoly in the marketplace.
On another view, Justice Souter’s approach would not alter the operation
of any monopoly exception in the sort of case typified by the no-othercement-seller hypothetical variation on Reeves. In that hypothetical, the
difficulty is that the would-be out-of-state buyer is entirely shut out from
securing a needed product because of the state seller’s monopoly position. 116
In United Haulers, however, the Government’s exertion of monopoly power
did not affect out-of-state buyers at all. 117 Instead, it imposed a burden on instate buyers of waste services. 118 Thus (so the argument goes) the two cases
differ in terms of both economic structure and political-process realities.
In the end, it is not clear whether endorsement of Justice Souter’s
broadened conception of the market-participant doctrine would bring with it
the demise of any now-existing, monopoly-based limit on that doctrine’s
operation. The key point, however, is crystal clear. Justice Souter’s rhetoric
would create a new and inviting opening for courts to abandon any such
monopoly exception. 119

113 See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 444 (1980) (noting that South Dakota
had not “restricted the ability of private firms or sister States to set up [cement] plants
within its borders”).
114 See supra note 31 & accompanying text.
115 A monopoly is typically defined as “[c]ontrol or advantage obtained by one
supplier or producer over the commercial market within a given region.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1098 (9th ed. 2009). In United Haulers, the flow-control ordinance forced
citizens to have their trash sent off for handling to one government-owned facility. See
United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 330. The municipality, through the forced-use law, became
the single supplier of waste processing in that region and therefore had a monopoly on
waste processing.
116 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1813.
117 United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 345.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 354 (Thomas, J., concurring).

2009]

MARKET PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION

1203

c. Part III-B and the State-Self-Promotion Principle
The Court in United Haulers and in Part III-A of Davis established a new
state-self-promotion limit on the Commerce Clause antidiscrimination
principle. 120 A major question presented by Davis concerns how a judicial
embrace of the reasoning of Part III-B would interact with the state-selfpromotion limit and affect its reach. 121 The most probable answer to this
question is that the market-participant exception as reformulated in Part III-B
would essentially cover all the ground now occupied by the state-selfpromotion principle and cover much additional ground as well. In particular,
an endorsement of Justice Souter’s Part III-B analysis would, as a practical
matter, untether the United Haulers doctrine from any limit based on either
(1) the nontraditional character of the government’s action or (2) the
continuing applicability of Pike balancing analysis. These refinements would
have the real-world effect of significantly expanding the new dormant
Commerce Clause immunity espoused in United Haulers.

i. Nontraditional State Activities
One complexity raised by Justice Souter’s market-participant analysis
concerns judicial treatment of forced-use rules—or any sort of regulatory or
taxing measures—that are connected to state market participation of a
nontraditional sort. Consider Reeves. 122 What if, instead of simply preferring
South Dakotans in selling cement from its state-owned plant, South Dakota
had required all in-state purchasers to buy cement from it? Under the
reasoning of United Haulers and Part III-A of Davis standing alone, it is far
from clear that this forced-use rule would pass constitutional muster. When
the Court upheld the waste transfer station forced-use rule in United Haulers,
and again applied United Haulers in Part III-A of Davis, it went out of its
way to emphasize that it was dealing with something that was “both typically
and traditionally a function of local government.” 123 Because cement selling
(to say the least) does not qualify as a traditional state undertaking, a legal
challenge to any forced-use rule applied to the South Dakota plant would
present a difficult question under the principle set forth in United Haulers. 124
120 See supra notes 8, 12–13, 20 & accompanying text.
121 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1812.
122 See supra notes 39–41 & accompanying text.
123 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810; see United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 344.
124 See Coenen, Where United Haulers Might Take Us, supra note 8, at 50–57

(considering this question and whether, in particular, the Court will ultimately embrace a
traditional-activity/nontraditional-activity distinction in applying the state-self-promotion
doctrine).
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Adoption of Part III-B of Justice Souter’s opinion, however, would
transform this nettlesome question into a no-brainer. This is the case because
(1) Justice Souter indicated in Part III-B that the market-participant doctrine,
if properly applied, would shelter the forced-use rule at issue in United
Haulers; 125 and (2) under settled doctrine, the market-participant doctrine
operates whether the state is engaged in a traditional public activity (such as
selling waste disposal services) or a traditionally nonpublic activity (such as
selling cement). 126 To put the same point differently, the only way to
distinguish the forced-use rule in United Haulers from the forced-use rule in
our hypothetical state-cement-sale case would be to say that the cement case
involves nontraditional, rather than traditional, government activity. If we
follow Part III-B in recasting United Haulers as a market-participant case,
however, that distinction could not take hold because the market-participant
exception applies equally to traditional and nontraditional undertakings. To
be sure, one could argue that it should matter for market-participant purposes
whether the state’s marketplace activity is traditional in nature. But that is
precisely the argument—made in powerful terms by Justice Powell 127 —that
a majority of the Court rejected in Reeves itself. 128
The bottom line is this: At least as of today, the rule of United Haulers
goes no further than to shelter challenged regulatory measures when they are
tied to traditional forms of state action in transferring valuable property or
125 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811 (indicating that the forced-use rule fell under the
“broader rubric of the market-participant doctrine”).
126 See infra notes 128–29 & accompanying text.
127 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 449 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the market-participant rule should hinge on “the nature of the governmental activity
involved” and that the exception should only apply when “a public enterprise undertakes
an ‘integral operatio[n] in areas of traditional government functions’” (alteration in
original) (citation omitted)).
128 See id. at 438 n.10 (“Even where ‘integral operations’ are not implicated, States
may fairly claim some measure of a sovereign interest in retaining freedom to decide
how, with whom, and for whose benefit to deal.”); accord David S. Bogen, The Market
Participant Doctrine and the Clear Statement Rule, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 543, 556
(2006) (stating that the Reeves Court expressly “rejected the traditional function theory as
the basis for the market participant doctrine by applying the market participant doctrine
to cement production, which is not a traditional function of government”); Dan T.
Coenen, The Impact of the Garcia Decision on the Market-Participant Exception to the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 727, 740–42 (asserting that Alexandria
Scrap did not distinguish between “‘governmental’ and ‘proprietary’ activities” but rather
distinguished between states that acted as “market-participants” and states that acted as
“market regulators”); David Pomper, Comment, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey:
the Dormant Commerce Clause, Postindustrial ‘Natural’ Resources, and the Solid Waste
Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1321–22 (1989) (arguing that the market-participant
exception should apply whether the state is functioning in its traditional capacity or not).
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services. The market-participant doctrine, in contrast, applies without regard
to the traditional or nontraditional nature of the state’s activities. 129 Part III-B
of the Davis opinion thus invites a significant de facto expansion of the
United Haulers principle. By dressing that principle in new marketparticipant attire, Justice Souter would strip away any nontraditional-activity
limitation on its operation. 130

ii. Pike Balancing Analysis
An embrace of Part III-B of Justice Souter’s opinion in Davis would
have a second major impact on the state-self-promotion limitation formulated
in United Haulers. Why? Because it would remove any need in UnitedHaulers-type cases for courts to engage in the sort of dormant Commerce
Clause interest-balancing analysis undertaken in United Haulers itself.
To understand this point, it is necessary to recognize that the Court’s
work in United Haulers proceeded in two steps. First, the Court found that
the state-self-promoting forced-use rule did not embody the sort of
“discrimination” that triggers exacting scrutiny under the dormant Commerce
Clause principle. 131 Second, the Court considered whether that forced-use
rule nonetheless ran afoul of the more tolerant style of constitutional analysis
encapsulated in the balancing formula of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 132
Under the Pike test, the Court will invalidate even a nondiscriminatory
statute if “the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits.” 133 In the end, the Court in United
Haulers found no problem with the challenged flow control law under the
Pike standard. 134 The pivotal point for present purposes, however, is that the
Court signaled by way of this two-step dance that regulations exempted from
antidiscrimination analysis under the state-self-promotion principle would
129 See supra note 128 & accompanying text.
130 See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, The False Modesty of Department of

Revenue v. Davis: Disrupting the Dormant Commerce Clause Through the Traditional
Public Function Doctrine (manuscript on file with author) (broadly exploring
implications of Court’s advancing of the traditional-activity/nontraditional-activity
distinction in Davis).
131 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 345 (2007) (“[T]he Counties’ flow control ordinances, which treat in-state private
business interests exactly the same as out-of-state ones, do not ‘discriminate against
interstate commerce’ for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause.”).
132 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The test is reserved for laws “directed to legitimate
local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental.” City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
133 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
134 United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 347.
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nonetheless remain subject to Pike-balancing review and subject to
invalidation under it in a proper case. 135
This elaboration of United Haulers highlights a critical difference
between Part III-A and Part III-B of the Davis opinion. Given the fact that a
majority of the Court joined only Part III-A, Justice Souter concluded in
Davis that there was good reason to consider whether Kentucky’s tax break
was unconstitutional under Pike analysis—and that is just what he did in a
separate section of the opinion labeled Part IV. 136 There can be little doubt,
however, that a majority’s endorsement of Part III-B would have swept away
any need to engage in a Pike-balancing inquiry. Justice Souter himself made
the key point when he wrote: “United Haulers included a Pike
analysis . . . but our cases applying the market participant exception have
not.” 137 This statement is on the mark because the Court has never even
considered applying Pike analysis in market-participant cases. It has
proceeded in this way based on simple logic: When a state acts as a market
participant, “no conflict between state regulation and federal regulatory
authority can arise” 138 because the conduct of the state does not involve
regulatory action at all. 139 In United Haulers, however, the Court took an
entirely different view of the State’s forced-use rule. Precisely because it saw
that rule as regulatory in nature, it refused to exempt the rule altogether from
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. 140 Instead, the Court did subject the
challenged rule to review, but only to the ratcheted-down style of review
reflected in the Pike methodology. 141

135 Id. at 346–47.
136 Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1817 (2008). In fact, there was a

strong reason not to apply Pike balancing in Davis because that case involved a
challenged tax law, rather than a challenged regulation, and the Court has historically not
subjected state tax laws to Pike-balancing analysis. See, e.g., Coenen, Where United
Haulers Might Take Us, supra note 8, at 59–60. Justice Souter noted, however, that all
parties in Davis had seen fit to evaluate the Kentucky tax rule under Pike, and for this
reason he proceeded to do so as well. The Court’s application of Pike analysis even to the
tax law at issue in Davis reinforces the key point suggested here because it highlights the
importance of Pike analysis in applying the state-self-promotion rule in striking contrast
to its irrelevance in the market participation context.
137 Davis, 127 S. Ct. at 1817.
138 United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 220
(1984); see also New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988) (noting that only
when a state acts in its “distinctive governmental capacity” is the dormant Commerce
Clause applicable).
139 United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 465 U.S. at 220.
140 United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 342–45.
141 Id.
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What all of this means is that a judicial embrace of Part III-B would
sharply alter preexisting law because it would move cases such as United
Haulers and Davis into the market-participant camp. And because marketparticipant cases do not trigger Pike review, the potential for Pike-based
invalidation that now exists under the more focused state-self-promotion rule
would vanish from the scene. As a practical matter, the ability of courts to
apply Pike balancing review in state-self-promotion cases rendered the
inroad made by United Haulers on the dormant Commerce Clause
restraint—although significant—far more limited than it might have been.
Endorsement of Part III-B of Justice Souter’s opinion would remove that
limitation and thus bring about a far greater contraction of dormant
Commerce Clause protections than was worked in United Haulers itself.

III. DAVIS AND DOCTRINAL UNCERTAINTY
As we have seen, Justice Souter’s new rhetoric of market participation
raises the prospect of a large-scale dilution of the dormant Commerce Clause
principle. 142 Or does it? Justice Souter might observe that such a claim is
wildly exaggerated. Part III-B, after all, does not purport to overrule a single
dormant Commerce Clause precedent. And even Part III-B’s treatment of
United Haulers might be viewed as not putting that case in the marketparticipant camp; perhaps, for example, the plurality mentioned United
Haulers in Part III-B only to show that the Court had previously (albeit
outside the market-participant context) examined a regulation’s linkage to
state market participation in applying the dormant Commerce Clause, so that
examining that same linkage in applying the market-participant doctrine in
Davis should come as no surprise.
Whatever one might say about these matters, one thing is plain: If Part
III-B is embraced as governing law, it will raise a host of new questions
about the market-participant rule. For example: Are all forms of state
regulation (including outright embargoes, tariffs, and flat bans on
importation) potentially sheltered from invalidation by the market-participant
doctrine if they are linked to some identifiable state market activity? 143
142 See supra notes 79–82 & accompanying text (discussing effect of Justice

Souter’s analysis on tax cases); notes 96–102 & accompanying text (discussing effect on
the Court’s opinion in Baldwin); notes 107–09 & accompanying text (discussing effect on
downstream restraint cases such as South-Central Timber); notes 112–15 &
accompanying text (discussing effect on monopoly exception); notes 127–29 &
accompanying text (discussing effect on distinction between traditional and
nontraditional state activity); notes 131–35 & accompanying text (discussing effect on
use of Pike balancing in state-self-promotion cases).
143 Justice Souter’s treatment of United Haulers itself indicates that some localprocessing requirements would be sustainable on market-participant grounds. See Dep’t
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Whatever the form of state activity, what degree of interconnection between
a challenged regulation (including by way of taxation) and permitted state
market participation will suffice to trigger Justice Souter’s linkage principle?
Must the linkage be such that non-state transactions are entirely (or
essentially or largely or substantially) unaffected? Is the nature of the linkage
more important than its spillover effects on private transactions? And,
however linkage is gauged, will higher or lower levels of linkage be tolerated
depending on the type, scope, and practical effect of the particular regulation
(and market participation) at issue? These questions serve to highlight the
lingering amorphousness of Part III-B.
Two other features of Justice Souter’s market-participant analysis
contribute to the swirl of uncertainty. Those features concern (1) the
analytical pathway that Justice Souter chose not to take in Part III-B and (2)
Justice Stevens’ decision to join Part III-B while also writing separately
about his own perspective on the market-participant doctrine.

A. The Road Not Taken
One troublesome aspect of Part III-B comes into view when one asks a
simple question: Could Justice Souter have put forward a different and more
stable analysis to uphold the Kentucky program under the market-participant
doctrine? As it turns out, he could have crafted a much narrower marketparticipant rationale, and the fact that he eschewed this route heightens the
confusion left in the wake of Davis.
A less ambitious Part III-B would have begun with language along the
following lines:
We held in Part III-A that Kentucky’s tax-based favoritism of bonds issued
by Kentucky and its instrumentalities is shielded from antidiscriminationbased attack by the state-self-promotion exception first recognized in the
United Haulers case. We now further hold that, even if United Haulers had
gone the other way, Kentucky’s program would find shelter in the marketparticipant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause.

This opening (unlike the actual opening of Part III-B) would have made
clear why an alternative analysis under the market-participant doctrine was
worth pursuing, would have avoided the adventurous effort to shoehorn
of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1811 (2008). So why would the immunity not
extend to other forms of state action historically viewed as protectionist, such as heavy
burdens or outright bans on importation from outside the state or embargoes imposed to
keep valuable resources from moving outside the state? See Coenen, Where United
Haulers Might Take Us, supra note 8, at 39–40 (explaining why United Haulers in effect
involved an import ban).
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United Haulers into the market-participant category, 144 and would have
pointed the way to a more satisfactory analytical route than the one that
Justice Souter (having started off on the wrong foot) actually traversed.
In the next step of a more satisfying analysis, Justice Souter would have
acknowledged that United Haulers presented a case of market regulation,
rather than market participation, because it involved an unmistakably
coercive government directive. 145 He then would have observed that the
program in Davis, in telling contrast, did not coerce anyone to do anything,
because no one needed to buy bonds. Having set the stage this way, he could
have gone on to explain that: (1) under ordinary circumstances, tariffs and
other forms of discriminatory tax laws are rightly viewed as regulatory in
nature; 146 (2) the discriminatory tax at issue in Davis nonetheless differed
from the discriminatory taxes invalidated in past cases because it favored instate commerce only with the State itself rather than with private entities; 147
and (3) that, for this reason, Davis in fact posed a novel (and very narrow)
market-participant question. That narrow question was whether tax relief
afforded by a state to make the state’s own bonds more attractive to some
buyers is more properly characterized as regulation of the bond market or as
a component part of the bond product sold by the state itself.
Having framed the question this way, Justice Souter could have
answered it by characterizing the tax break as a component part of the bond
product, rather than as a form of state regulation. (The tax break, after all,
was tied directly and only to the acquisition of bonds created by the State
itself; it immediately shaped the value of those bonds; it generated revenues
for use only by the State itself; it operated only for the duration of the bonds’
existence; and it created costs to the very same public fisc out of which bond
proceeds were solely funded.) 148 To be sure, this characterization would
have invited criticism on the ground that it afforded market-participant
protection, for the first time ever, to a state taxing program. 149 Justice Souter,
144 See supra note 31 & accompanying text.
145 See supra note 44 & accompanying text.
146 This is the case in part because they are quasi-coercive in that those who do

engage in the taxed activity must pay the tax, in part because they involve an activity that
only governments can undertake, and in part because practical and historical
understandings recognize these programs’ inevitable regulatory effects. See Coenen,
Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption, supra note 6, at 430–35; Galle & Yale,
supra note 20, at 113–46 (observing that “[t]axation is a ‘regulatory’ function”).
147 In fact, Justice Souter made this point in so many words. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at
1809 (aligning Davis with United Haulers, in that state action that benefits the state itself
is different from “laws favoring particular private businesses over their competitors”).
148 See Brief for Petitioners at 3–8, Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801
(2008) (No. 06-666).
149 See supra note 86 & accompanying text.

1210

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:5

however, might have parried that thrust with an observation that went like
this:
In the distinctive context of state-supplied products, it makes little sense to
flatly reject the idea that a tax break can never be a protected element of
market participation. By way of example, the Court in Reeves upheld South
Dakota’s exclusion of all out-of-state residents from the purchase of statemade cement. To us it logically follows, on the ground that the greater
power must include the lesser, that South Dakota could have permitted outof-state residents to buy cement while imposing a tax on such sales from
which in-state buyers were exempt. For this reason, we reject the idea that
the market-participant exception can never shelter discriminatory tax laws
from constitutional challenge, even while accepting the idea that the
market-participant doctrine will apply in the tax context only under unusual
conditions. The key in our Reeves hypothetical, just like here, is that the
underlying product with which the State tax break is associated is one that is
created by the State, marketed by the State, and used by the State both to
benefit its citizens and to fund its own operations.

Perhaps Justice Souter meant for Part III-B to say nothing of
consequence that went beyond the contents of the three preceding
paragraphs. In fact, however, he did say more. He recast United Haulers as a
market-participant case. 150 He broadly reframed the underlying rationales of
White and Alexandria Scrap. 151 He endorsed the innovative notion that
activity properly characterized as market regulation may be sheltered under
the market-participant rubric. 152 He set forth a new “part and parcel” test
without identifying any limiting principles to guide its application. 153 And he
left open the possibility that his version of the market-participant exception
would lead to judicial toleration of forms of state regulation that go well
beyond simply defining the terms of a business arrangement made with the
state itself. 154 This is not to say that the more narrow and structured marketparticipant analysis advanced in the preceding paragraphs is so compelling as
to withstand any and all criticism. 155 It is to say, however, that the analysis
150 See supra note 31 & accompanying text.
151 See supra notes 48–55, 62–70 & accompanying text.
152 See supra note 25 & accompanying text.
153 See supra note 63 & accompanying text.
154 See, e.g., supra notes 98–102 & accompanying text (discussing the Baldwin

case).
155 For example, the challengers of the state program of Davis argued that taxation,

by definition, cannot qualify as market participation because private traders cannot
impose taxes and one element of the Court’s market-participant logic is that states should
share the rights of “the trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business.”
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438–39 (1980) (quoting United States v. Colgate &
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actually embodied in Part III-B carries with it many more uncertainties than
this posited alternative analysis would have engendered.

B. The Stevens Wild Card
A final complexity presented by Part III-B is raised by the curious fact
that Justice Stevens joined it in full while also writing his own concurring
opinion. 156 Justice Stevens wrote separately to explain why he “would join
the Court's opinion even if [Reeves and United Haulers] had been decided
differently” because he had in fact dissented in each of those cases. 157 So
what does Justice Stevens’s opinion tell us about Part III-B?
To begin with, Justice Stevens did not abandon his earlier positions by
signing onto either the result reached in United Haulers or the Reeves-based
version of the market-participant doctrine. 158 Rather, he expressed continued
adherence to his minority position in both Reeves and United Haulers,
reiterating his view that “when a ‘State enters the private market and operates
a commercial enterprise for the advantage of its private citizens, it may not
evade the constitutional policy against economic Balkanization.’” 159 That
principle, he explained, did not apply in Davis because Kentucky had not
undertaken to “operat[e] a commercial enterprise”; rather it was “merely
borrow[ing] money ‘to pay for spending on transportation, public safety,
education, utilities, and environmental protection.’” 160 In these
circumstances, Justice Stevens detected no dormant Commerce Clause
problem because a “[s]tate’s reliance on ‘general taxes or municipal bonds’
to finance public projects does not merit the same Commerce Clause scrutiny
as ‘operating a fee-for-service business enterprise in an area where there is an
established interstate market.’” 161 According to Justice Stevens, “state action
that motivates the State’s taxpayers to lend money to the State”—whether in
the form of state tax breaks or the offering of “[f]ree tickets to the Kentucky

Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)); see Julander, supra note 6, at 552 (noting that marketparticipant exception developed in light of “the long recognized right of private traders to
choose their own trading partners”); id. at 554 (noting that a “tax credit” is not an
“activity of a private purchaser”).
156 See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1804 (2008).
157 Id. at 1819 (Stevens, J., concurring).
158 Id. at 1820.
159 Id. (quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 449–50 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)).
160 Id.
161 Id. (quoting United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 334 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting)).
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Derby”—“is simply not the sort of ‘burden’ on interstate commerce that is
implicated by our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.” 162
One is left in a head-scratching state by Justice Stevens’s analysis. How
could he join Part III-A of the Souter opinion—which is founded squarely on
a straightforward application of United Haulers—at the very time he
reiterated his view that United Haulers was an erroneous decision? How
could he join Part III-B, which seemed to endorse just the sort of expansive
vision of the market-participant doctrine from which Justice Stevens took
pains to distance himself in his separate concurrence? And how could Justice
Stevens characterize Davis as a case that did not involve a state’s “operating
a fee-for-service business enterprise in an area in which there is an
established interstate market”? 163 In fact, there exists an “established
interstate market” in debt instruments, and selling such instruments for cash
is not hard to view as “operating a fee-for-service business enterprise” 164 —at
least once one makes the easy move of viewing as a valuable “service” the
transformation of X amount of cash into an X+Y stream of payments made
over time. 165
One possibility is that Justice Stevens viewed Justice Souter’s opinion as
focusing primarily on the states’ historic use of bonded indebtedness, 166 their
issuance of bonds “to finance public projects,” 167 and the inevitability that
states had to raise money in some way to engage in their core activities. 168
Put another way, Justice Stevens may have signed onto Part III-B of Justice
Souter's opinion only on the understanding that it endorsed (or at least
invited) a reframing of the market-participant exception along the lines
advanced thirty years earlier in the Reeves dissent—that is, as a doctrine that
can operate only when the state undertakes “traditional” government
activities. 169
This possibility lends another—and a distinctively sticky—layer of
uncertainty to the plurality’s application of the market-participant exception
in Davis. Up until now, our parsing of Part III-B has suggested that it
162 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1820–21.
163 Id. at 1820.
164 Id.
165 Id. Few would disagree with the proposition, for example, that banks provide a

“service” for a “fee” when they sell certificates of deposit redeemable in one year at an
amount that reflects both principal and interest. Justice Stevens never explained why state
sales of functionally identical debt instruments do not likewise involve a “fee-for-service
business enterprise.”
166 Id. at 1806–08.
167 Id. at 1820 (Stevens, J., concurring).
168 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811 (majority opinion).
169 See supra notes 127–28 & accompanying text.
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envisions a controversial expansion of the market-participant exception and a
concomitant narrowing of dormant Commerce Clause restraints. 170 In
striking contrast, the reading extrapolated here from Justice Stevens’s curious
joining of Part III-B would move the law in exactly the opposite direction.
By tying the market-participant exception to traditional state conduct, this
alternate reading would narrow that exception, including by overturning the
Court's seminal market-participant decision in the Reeves case itself.
Is such a translation of Part III-B possible? It involves a stretch, in part
because Justice Souter laid out the holding of Reeves, without ever
questioning its authority, both in Part II of the opinion 171 and in a textual
footnote in Part III-B. 172 On the other hand, Justice Souter’s actual marketparticipant analysis in Part III-B puts primary emphasis on United Haulers,
Alexandria Scrap, and White—all of which might well be seen as “traditional
function” cases. 173 No less important: (1) Justice Souter's opinion
emphasized and reemphasized that states historically have issued bonds for
public purposes and favored their own taxpayers in doing so; 174 (2) although
this theme is not a focal point of Part III-B, it dominates not only Part III-A
but also the opening and closing segments of Justice Souter’s opinion; 175 and
(3) in particular, the ringing conclusion of that opinion excoriates the
dissenters’ approach precisely because (a) they embrace “the adventurism of
overturning a traditional local taxing practice;” 176 (b) they “would
upset . . . settled expectations . . . based on the experience of nearly a
century;” 177 and (c) they ignore “the long settled habits of the community,”
which (according to no less an icon than Justice Holmes) should “play a part”
in resolving constitutional disputes. 178 Perhaps, in the view of Justice
Stevens, these passages gave rise to an analytical theme that both overlaid
and logically limited the market-participant analysis put forward by Justice
Souter in Part III-B.
170 See supra note 142 & accompanying text.
171 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1809.
172 Id. at 1814 n.16.
173 See United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550

U.S. 330, 334 (2007) (stating that the waste disposal involved in that case was “both
typically and traditionally” a state function); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 451
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (highlighting that, unlike the State’s actions in Reeves, the
State’s actions in Alexandria Scrap embodied a traditional government function).
174 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1806; id. at 1810–11; id. at 1819.
175 See id. at 1806 (discussing, in opening the opinion, the history of differential tax
breaks on municipal bonds); id. at 1810 (discussing the same throughout Part III-A); id.
at 1819 (discussing the same in the opinion’s closing section).
176 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1819.
177 Id.
178 Id.

1214

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:5

Might a future Court, if it were to embrace Justice Souter’s opinion in
toto, actually find in it the seeds of the destruction of Reeves? The possibility
that it could do so underscores the key point offered here. If Justice Souter’s
opinion in Davis brings sweeping new uncertainties to the Court's marketparticipant jurisprudence—as it surely does—Justice Stevens’s joining of
that opinion brings even more, when viewed in the light of his separate
concurrence.

CONCLUSION
“There’s something happening here, but what it is ain’t exactly clear.” 179
These lyrics were not written by Stephen Stills to deal with dormant
Commerce Clause law, but they might aptly be sung—indeed, sung with
intensity—about Justice Souter’s market-participant analysis in the Davis
case. The cryptic character and indeterminate implications of Part III-B
surely contributed to its most salient feature—namely, its failure to garner
the support of a majority of the Court. The six Justices who declined to join
Part III-B acted wisely in refusing to embrace Justice Souter’s newfangled
treatment of the market-participant doctrine. In the future, they should go
even further by rejecting that treatment in no uncertain terms.
As this Essay demonstrates, that course of action is advisable because
endorsement of Justice Souter’s analysis would (1) radically reformulate the
basic rhetoric of the market-participant exception; (2) invite major changes in
doctrine, including by way of an ill-advised narrowing of salutary dormant
Commerce Clause restraints, and (3) inject profound uncertainties into this
already complex field of law. The Supreme Court has rightly declared that
the market-participant doctrine, in its present form, reflects both “good sense
and sound law.” 180 In the end, the Court should eschew Justice Souter’s Part
III-B analysis because its revisionist approach to that doctrine is undeserving
of the same benign description.

179 STEPHEN STILLS, For What It’s Worth, on BUFFALO SPRINGFIELD (Atco 1967);

see also BOB DYLAN, Ballad of a Thin Man, on HIGHWAY 61 REVISITED (Columbia 1965)
(“something is happening here/[b]ut you don’t know what it is, do you Mr. Jones?”);
MARVIN GAYE, What’s Going On, on WHAT’S GOING ON (Tamla 1971) (“What’s going
on? What’s going on? . . . Oh, what’s going on?”).
180 Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436.

